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LEGAL AESTHETICS OF THE FAMILY AND THE NATION:
AGORAXCHANGE AND NOTES TOWARD RE-IMAGING
THE FUTURE
JACQUELINE STEVENS*
I.

OVERVIEW

This paper lays out the legal aesthetics behind agoraXchange,1
an online forum for the rules, design, and code of an online global
politics game. A crucial premise of the project is that experts and
politicians who use evolutionary rhetoric to defend the laws that
have created our present institutions of family and nation are not
simply bad social scientists; they are also bad artists. Such leaders of
political institutions, as well as their minions in the academy, transform us into passive subjects who must accept as our birthright alliances of family and nation that these natural and social scientists
actually invent for us.
The agoraXchange website and the forthcoming game pay special attention to the distributive implications of institutions that organize us into families and nations. These are the primary sites
where invocations of birth cause inequality and violence.2 Laws
constructing beliefs about ancestry give rise to war and the intergenerational transfers of wealth that are responsible for between
40% and 90% of economic inequality among and within nations.3
* Assistant Professor at University of California, Santa Barbara. Ph.D. University
of California, Berkeley, 1993; A.B. Smith College, 1984.
1. http://www.agoraxchange.net (last modified July 22, 2004). The internet site
is a project commissioned and hosted by an art museum, Tate Online, and initiated and
coordinated by Natalie Bookchin and Jacqueline Stevens. A detailed explanation of the
theory and empirical evidence for agoraXchange appears in Jacqueline Stevens, States
without Nations (in progress, unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
2. See JACQUELINE STEVENS, REPRODUCING THE STATE 3 (1999).
3. See Lawrence Kotlikof & Lawrence Summers, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. OF POL. ECON. 706 (1981) (attributing 70% of
all U.S. wealth as resulting of intergenerational transfers). Economists debate these
figures and the methods for ascertaining them, but the range is seldom under 50% and
of course, by definition, never acquired through individual effort. Hence inequalities
perpetuated by family origin are always incompatible with liberal capitalist modes of
accumulation. This range most likely understates the importance of intergenerational
transfers of wealth worldwide because the United States is one of the most mobile socie317
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The aim of agoraXchange is to demonstrate how law constructs inequalities in a way that makes them seem entirely natural, and to
enlist participants in developing alternatives.4
In keeping with this analysis, the forum solicits ideas for an
alternative world game, one in which players may choose any state
in which to be citizens; wealth at death is redistributed through a
global agency to provide for basic needs; there is no official kinship
relation recognized by any state; and states own all land, assigning
use to individuals and corporations through long-term or lifetime
leases.
The site emphasizes the trope of birth and not capitalism because one’s birth status not only substantively affects the quality of
one’s life, but also because hereditary aesthetics make people believe inequality and violence are impossible to challenge, a view that
leads to passive acceptance of the status quo. Drawing on the collective contributions of a global public to develop a game in which
governments do not legislate distinctions of birth (through either
immigration policies or inheritance laws) and then putting this
game online is an experimental and synechdocal rendering of the
new collaborations and conflicts that might emerge in this alternative global system. AgoraXchange is at once both a model and a
small example, designed to reveal how the present world order is
the result of elective choices.
Such a project clearly draws from many literatures and invites
many kinds of disagreements as to the desirability and feasibility of
these goals. For purposes of this Essay, rather than defend the proposals on their merits, the Essay addresses a recurring problem that
faces any effort that fundamentally challenges prevailing legal institutions: the concept of “human nature.” Any discussion of how to
ties in the history of the world. If parental wealth has such a large influence on the next
generation’s wealth, then one’s material conditions of birth clearly are significant, not
only in the United States, but also elsewhere. As suggested in his study of pre-industrial
countries, J. Bradford DeLong found that inherited wealth alone accounted for a whopping 91% of all wealth. J. Bradford Delong, MIMEO, INHERITANCE: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2001), cited in Karen Dynan, Jonathan Skinner & Stephen P. Zeldes, The
Importance of Bequests and Life-Cycle Saving in Capital Accumulation: A New Answer, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 277, 2002.
4. See Jacqueline Stevens, On the Class Question, in FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF
KARL MARX (Christine diStefano ed., forthcoming), available at www.jacquelinestevens.
org (last updated Aug. 3, 2004).

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR117.txt

2004]

unknown

Seq: 3

LEGAL AESTHETICS OF THE FAMILY AND THE NATION

8-DEC-04

13:52

319

imagine future forms of governance that would change the family
and the nation is strongly influenced by intuitions about human
nature. Often unstated, these beliefs nonetheless shape, if not determine, the kinds of changes thought beneficial and possible.
After a brief discussion of the still novel phrase “legal aesthetics,” the Essay maps the terrain on which political and legal theory
since the late 19th century has grappled with questions about
human nature, pointing out how the economic social science used
to guide public policy has been drawn from a very narrow camp of
writers, namely, those who advance sociobiological visions that are
simply ugly (as well as empirically questionable). Next, the sociobiological hypothesis of inevitable aggression that arises from group
loyalties is reviewed and critiqued, especially as it bears on intuitions about the family and the nation. This is discussed at some
length because its claims have a very profound resonance in today’s
popular and legal imagination. Third, the relevance of these legal
aesthetics in shaping who we are is explained in some detail. Finally, this Essay describes how agoraXchange challenges evolutionary psychologists’ assumptions about human nature.
II. LEGAL AESTHETICS
In the last few years legal theorists have begun to pay increasing attention to legal aesthetics.5 In some approaches, legal aesthetics is simply the use of law to regulate images. For others, legal
aesthetics is akin to an epistemology or a method implicit in judicial
opinions and scholarly texts. Finally, some scholars — and this is
the approach this Essay adopts — see the law as a wide-ranging aesthetic activity in itself.
A. Law and Overt Visual Policies
Costas Douzinas and Lynda Nead write, “[L]aw has always had
a visual policy and understood the importance of the governance of
images for the maintenance of the social bond.”6 This is probably
the most accessible understanding of legal aesthetics pertaining to
5. See LAW AND AESTHETICS 10-17 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1992) (early contributions defining the sub-field of legal aesthetics).
6. See LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 5
(Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999).
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legal policies regulating everything from pornography to public art.
While many important studies exist in this field, this conventional
understanding of what counts as art and image may also reinforce
narrow thinking about legal texts and institutions. The notion that
there is a fairly circumscribed field of what counts as “art” deters us
from seeing how all sorts of forms and objects, including laws themselves, can be seen as art. This is not to say that all objects must be
seen as art, only that the dichotomy that separates regulatory subjects from their objects discourages us from using a more subtle
vocabulary in which to understand art and law (and much else).
B. Legal Writing
In a study of what he calls the aesthetics of U.S. American law,
Peter Schlag focuses on “forms shaping law,” and not laws shaping
forms. “In this conception,” Schlag writes, “the aesthetic pertains to
the forms, images, tropes, perceptions, and sensibilities that help
shape the creation, apprehension, and even identity of human endeavors, including, most topically, law.”7 If one consults his quadpartite taxonomy (the grid, energy, perspectivist, and dissociative)8
one begins to sense, however, that his analyses deal with studies
other than those of aesthetics. Schlag puts center stage the criteria
of truth or the narrative strategies used and advocated for the interpretation of U.S. Constitutional law. At any point in his analysis
one could substitute “epistemology” or “genre” for “aesthetics”
without changing the meaning of his arguments. This is because
Schlag concerns himself with the project of specific interpretativist
strategies for reading Constitutional law, so that Schlag’s law is a
literary text that has attracted different readings, and not an object
or form in itself. The question to which Schlag’s article is really
responsive is “what are the different assumptions about the truth or
reality that exists in the Constitution and the style of reasoning that
follows from this?” This is not a bad question, but it seems that a
study of legal aesthetics, as distinct from legal criticism, would ask,
“How does the form of U.S.-American law relate to its content?” and
7. Peter Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1050
(2002); see also Brian E. Butler, Aesthetics and American Law, 27 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 203
(2003) (explaining that law has literary qualities that should enlist aesthetic
evaluations).
8. Schlag, supra note 7, at 1051-52.
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not inquire into truth claims or what counts as knowledge (the field
of epistemology). Or better ask, “How do we consider the relation
between the form of laws and their substance so as to better understand what law means?”9
C. Legal Aesthetics of the So-Called Real World
A third approach to legal aesthetics, and the one pursued in
this Essay, is that which sees law as a medium and an object of farreaching aesthetic effects and choices, capable of shaping the world
according to its authors’ blend of vision and impulse.10 The law’s
effects seem permanent and even inevitable, but they are always
subject to change. Inspired by Nietzsche’s understanding of power,
Adam Gearey writes:
The law rests upon an unsure foundation. Law embodies
a form, a set of values that mandate a way of living. What
allows the law to be posited in the first place could also
perhaps lead to its overcoming . . . . Aesthetics is, at
heart, this energy to mandate the form of a world, to create oneself.11

Although law contains imaginative energies, many of today’s
practitioners and scholars view the law as the result of an immutable sociobiological order: “The law effectively denies that the world
could be otherwise, but precisely because the world is constructed,
9. IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT (Clarendon Press 1952) (1795).
10. EVE DARIAN-SMITH, BRIDGING DIVIDES: THE CHANNEL TUNNEL AND ENGLISH LEGAL IDENTITY IN THE NEW EUROPE (1999). In Darian-Smith’s analysis, laws managing
specific territorial boundaries of the nation are reshaping the imaginations of local
populations in areas the tunnel impinges. The territory gains its look and meanings
through the micro-actions that occur in accord with a template of legal provisions, a
very powerful form with powerful substantive implications that also bears on nature and
other effects considered natural, such as one’s English identity. Reviewers aptly have
referred to an “ethnography of aesthetics,” in which “law emerges as both present and
absent, immediately consequential in times of conflict or change, but as a background
hum at other times, elusively ordering an aesthetic world without itself becoming the
primary aesthetic concern. This is the primordial stuff of legal consciousness . . .”
Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller & Neal Milner, Governing Out of Order: Space, Law, and the
Politics of Belonging, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 339, 361 (2002) (reviewing EVE DARIANSMITH, BRIDGING DIVIDES: THE CHANNEL TUNNEL AND ENGLISH LEGAL IDENTITY IN THE
NEW EUROPE (1999)).
11. ADAM GEAREY, LAW AND AESTHETICS 51 (John Gardner ed., 2001).
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it can be made again through conscious activity.”12 Although
Gearey does not mention this, Nietzsche himself addressed this
power of sociobiologists to distort the foundations of their work by
making them seem happened upon and not constructed, to appropriate the space that was divine will with that of the equally immutable natural order.13 In the case of family law and citizenship rules
— the focus of agoraXchange — the aesthetics of social Darwinians
shape the world of sex, reproduction, and violence in complicated
ways that belie the apparent parsimony of their starting
assumptions.
III. LAW

AND

HUMAN NATURE

James Madison wrote: “If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external
nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”14 While
widespread and apparently convincing, the premise misleads. The
problem for legal theorists is not simply that people behave in ways
that may advance selfish interests and therefore result in chaos and
brutality. In addition, there is also substantial disagreement as to
what counts as an “angel.” That is, political thought diverges fundamentally on what an imaginary perfect society would look like.
Would a society of angels distribute their work products
through a free market or would they have a centralized economy —
with one angel, a committee of angels, or a majority of angels deciding who would receive what? Would a society of angels have separate angel nations, or just one? Would a society of angels need
marriage laws to bestow special recognition on certain intimate relations? Would a society of angels rely on inheritance to distribute
wealth to the next generation? In short, regardless of whether we
assume people are angels or devils, substantial questions remain as
to how even perfect citizens would order their affairs. Rather than
accept the notion that political and legal theory is necessary because we are not angels, for angels and nonangels alike, we may
disagree as to how our affairs are best conducted.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 31.
See Jacqueline Stevens, On the Morals Of Genealogy, 31 POL. THEORY 558 (2003).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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Agreeing to some extent that they are angels themselves, or at
least not devils — no political theorist claims to advance ideas so
that evil and chaos will prevail, or to advance his or her selfish
agenda — political and legal theorists have adopted three basic approaches to grappling with the “human nature” of the subjects and
citizens populating their treatises. When it comes to the basic material with which they are working, they disagree about the nature
and malleability of human beings, offering three mutually exclusive
characterizations of human nature: (1) that it is plastic and made
good or bad by our political institutions; (2) that it is fundamentally
bad and political institutions are needed to repress inherently selfish, anti-social behaviors; and (3) that human nature is neither
good nor bad, but a fixed distillation of instincts whose evolution
should be recognized and drawn on by our political institutions in
ways consistent with our immutable impulses. Each choice is implicitly elaborating a distinct legal aesthetic, a taste for a certain
form of the body politic.
A. Human Nature Plastic
An example of the first point of view, that human nature is
malleable, can easily be seen in Plato’s Republic, where indoctrination about hierarchy can be used to create a just society and, in
turn, just subjects.15 In Plato’s account, there is little fixed in us —
including family structures and sex roles — but rather, our behaviors and ideas take shape as a result of how our political institutions
socialize us. Instruct people from an early age with new ideologies
through the dissemination of, say, a “noble lie” about one’s traits at
birth, and it is possible to create a society in which philosopher
kings will make good laws and people will accept them.16
Another especially prominent example of this point of view
can be seen in Thomas More’s Utopia.17 Here the possibility of a
15. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Benjamin Jowett trans., Prometheus Books 1986) (c.
360 B.C.).
16. Id., Bk. III. In this political fantasy, children are told they are born bronze
(farmers, merchants, craftspersons), silver (guardians), or gold (philosopher-kings),
the thought being that if you have a metal from birth your condition is therefore
inalterable.
17. SIR THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (Robert M. Adams ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co.
1975) (1516).
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completely different form of society is described — that of the
Utopians somewhere in South America — for the purpose of showing More’s contemporaries in England that the feudal exploitation
of serfs is not natural but a set of happenstance legal relations his
readers would be well-advised to reject. By revealing an alternative
human civilization, More implies England’s medieval norms are not
God-given, but contingent.18 Such is also the approach among the
scores of contemporary critical legal theorists who emphasize the
actual plasticity of hierarchies that also continue to persist in the
name of nature, especially those following from family roles (sex
and sexuality), as well as race.19
18. See generally id. Rich scholarly debate exists on various interpretative questions
occasioned by the publication of related texts framing Utopia, including the open letter
from Erasmus and the book’s publisher advancing More’s prank by authenticating the
text. Regardless of where More’s intentions lie along the dubiously dichotomized continuum of earnestness and irony, the very form — casting doubt on the necessity of
feudal institutions — could only produce in his audience feelings that some other political system was, if not desirable, at least feasible. A nice example and analysis of parody’s ultimately self-consuming impossibility can be seen in the observation of a New
York Times letter-writer who considers the mocking of some products on television entertainment shows as advertisements themselves, “Perhaps most effectively in ‘Saturday
Night Live’ or David Letterman’s parodies. Positive or negative, it sure makes me remember the product.” Diane Yamini, Ads if Not by Name, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2004, at
A18.
19. Various exemplary texts contend that inequalities of wealth, race, sex, sexuality, ethnicity, and nationality, are largely created by political institutions (and indeed
undermine the belief that these taxonomies even exist independent of political institutions). See, e.g., LOUIS ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY, AND OTHER ESSAYS (Ben
Brewster trans., 1971) (illustrating how the state plays a key role in organizing social
relations perceived to be free of state influence); see also LOUIS ALTHUSSER, SPECTRE OF
HEGEL: EARLY WRITINGS (G.M. Goshgarian trans., 1997) (illustrating how Marx underestimated the importance of the state in constituting social relations); NATION AND NARRATION (Homi Bhabha ed.,1990) (containing essays on the role of the state in shaping the
nation); FRANZ BOAS, RACE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (J.J. Augustin 1945) (containing
essays on how laws create differences among races); VIRGINIA DOMÍNGUEZ, WHITE BY
DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA (1986) (illustrating how legal
documents create racial classifications); W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE NEGRO (Univ. Penn. Press
2001) (1915) (Hegelian project to construct “the Negro” through an analysis of African
tribes and the political practices that ground the Negro in this geography); Lisa Duggan, Queering the State, 39 SOC. TEXT 1 (1994) (critiquing the role the state plays in
establishing marriage and heterosexuality); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) (critiquing the construction of a family unit and a set
of sexual relationships in a liberal state); PLATO, supra note 15 (advancing a possibility
of a state organizing hierarchies based on myths that they are natural); MICHAEL OMI &
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE
1990S (1994) (illustrating how state policies lead to racial stratification); MAX WEBER,
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B. Human Nature Evil
The framework emphasizing the plasticity of institutions and
people, while popular in law school journals and classrooms, does
not enjoy universal currency in politics, nor is it much listened to in
the halls of the Congress or other venues of policymaking in the
United States, where it would be dismissed as “idealistic,” or, indeed, utopian. Instead, social and legal theory written for policymakers in the areas of inequality and difference are far more likely
to draw on one of the two latter approaches to human nature. An
instance of the second approach is most commonly associated with
biblically-inflected scholarship that ultimately harks back to the
story of original sin, where punishment for a moment’s depravity
produces a species condemned to be sinful in perpetuity. With
great effort such impious impulses, at best, may be restrained in
one’s lifetime, the end being solace deferred until one’s troubling
(e.g., greedy, selfish, cruel, arrogant) mortal body and existence
have been shed.
As we shall see below, those who believe that human nature is
downright evil are eager to implement policies to curtail the consequences of evil, while those who are certain that human evil is natural have the banal urge to let it be.
C. Human Selfishness Natural
This third, Darwinian, approach to human nature, the main
focus of this Essay, is the one that is the most analytically confused,
but it is also one widely used among social scientists in the United
States, and it is especially prominent in the work of those promoting conservative political agendas, though, interestingly, the following premises are not widely embraced by political elites in other
countries.20 Assuming that human behaviors are fixed to result in a
relatively narrow range of outcomes and relations, theorists influenced by sociobiology spend little time evaluating differences in
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 2 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (arguing that
ethnicities and nationalities seemingly classified by “blood” are created by the state);
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1989) (arguing that
gender differences that seem natural are created by political institutions).
20. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (Beacon
Press 1992) (1954).
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other theorists’ or citizens’ preferred outcomes but study the biological similarities supposedly yielding similar preferences in circumstances held constant. “[I]f better behavioral models can yield
more effective legal tools,” writes Owen Jones, a prominent advocate of evolutionary psychology, “and if human behavior is influenced by evolutionary processes, then greater knowledge of how
evolutionary processes influence behavior may improve law’s ability
to regulate it.”21 According to this school of thought, human behavior is another branch of animal behavior. Although some of the
authors equivocate, the overwhelming message is that this Darwinian understanding of human nature should inform law-making, lawinterpretation, and law-enforcement. Just as one would not bring
to the study of the natural sciences a review of subjective preferences, say, for how gravity should function or how whales should
mate, what one thinks about how humans should behave is irrelevant to evolutionary psychologists as well.
It is a common refrain for sociobiologists to claim they are just
observing the facts and will leave to others the policy implications
of their research. John Beckstrom, a leading figure in the law and
sociobiology field, is one who doth protest in this vein rather
frequently:
I am a lawyer by formal training, but I am not writing this
book as an advocate. The book was written to simply report the considerable overlap between the interests of
lawyers and sociobiologists and to illustrate some areas
where the interests seem to entwine. Most knowledgeable
scientists would agree that sociobiological theory, as such,
should not be used as a basis for lawmaking until it has
become more settled and empirically substantiated.22

However, this and other caveats leave an impression reminiscent of
the cautious inventor, Agent Q, telling James Bond that the latest
nifty gadget is still being tested, while the audience shares Q’s
knowledge that this weapon will most certainly be used in a later
scene (and just as it was intended, with effects more stunning and
21. Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: Some Objections Considered, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 207, 209 (2001).
22. JOHN H. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW: THE BIOLOGY OF ALTRUISM IN
THE COURTROOM OF THE FUTURE 5 (1985).
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explosive than even Q had suggested). Indeed just four years later
Beckstrom himself will author a far less hesitant treatise replete
with policy proposals — Evolutionary Jurisprudence: Prospects and Limitations on the Use of Modern Darwinism throughout the Legal Process —
although nothing in the underlying sociobiology had changed.23
The epistemological commitment to an ostensibly objective
view of human development has dovetailed with those whose
agenda it is to construct a world of sexism, ethnic divisions, nepotism and greed. Exemplary of such a view is the work done by Richard Posner in a field he calls “bioeconomics,”24 which draws from
evolutionary theory in general and theories of genetic selection in
particular, including the work of Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene,
discussed below. While Posner himself is not on the cutting edge of
what its advocates refer to as the “law and evolutionary biology”
movement,25 his work is worth mentioning because of his stature as
a legal commentator, not to mention a federal judge, and the
resonance of his tendentious arguments outside the academy.
After dwelling for several chapters on the relevance of sociobiology to economic analysis, Posner comments that the “reader need
not accept sociobiology to find the main arguments of this book
persuasive.”26 The remark betrays the fascination with and authority of this field in the legal imagination. If sociobiology is not a
premise Posner needs to sustain his analyses then it seems either a
waste of time or manipulative to devote such space to this field. We
23.

JOHN H. BECKSTROM, EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE: PROSPECTS AND LIMITAUSE OF MODERN DARWINISM THROUGHOUT THE LEGAL PROCESS (1989).
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
25. According to Owen Jones, an advocate of this field who organized the Society
for Evolutionary Analysis in Law and runs a website supporting it, he himself should be
credited with the first use of the term “evolutionary analysis in law.” Owen Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C.L. REV.
1117, 1117 (1997); Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law, available at http://
www.sealsite.org (last visited at Sept. 30, 2004). The Gruter Institute is another organization devoting a substantial budget for seminars and reports proselytizing on the importance of evolutionary biology in law. See generally http://www.gruterinstitute.org/
gounder.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). The Gruter Institute is named after Margaret
Gruter, also considered a founder of this field with her early work in the 1980s. See infra
note 55 (citing numerous extensive critical reviews of this literature). My point here is
not to repeat these criticisms but to explain the aesthetic function of this discourse and
propose how we might go beyond it.
26. POSNER, supra note 24, at 110.
TIONS ON THE
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do not find Posner offering corollaries between his sociolegal observations and astrological predictions, accompanied by a similar
caveat. Posner knows that the astrological discourse would not be
taken seriously and would delegitimate his findings, whereas he believes that sociobiological credentials put his work in respectable
company and enhance the stature of his conclusions. Richard Epstein also uses a view of human nature to justify conservative policies.27 Thomas Grey observes that Epstein “reads into American
constitutional law the view with which Malthus scandalized the civilized world at the beginning of the 19th century — the view that
government must leave the weak and helpless to their fate.”28 It is
not surprising that Posner and Epstein, who both come out of the
Chicago School — known for its interest in applying economic
analyses to law — would both embrace evolutionary theory. As Epstein himself writes: “Economics no longer makes arbitrary postulates about individual behavior: it derives and refines its
assumptions through evolutionary theory, which explains not only
how wings evolve from limbs, but also what mental traits natural
selection equips ordinary human beings who breed, feed, and kill
in conditions of extreme scarcity.”29
Despite variation in human behavior, numerous social scientists and politicians have used analyses such as those in Posner and
Epstein to infer very narrow and strong norms for our political-economic institutions. Although serious evolutionary biologists acknowledge that they find natural selection accommodates selfish, as
well as altruistic behaviors, the public policy proponents of evolutionary biology in law pursue strictly conservative political agendas.30 But matters would not improve if the sociobiologists’
accommodations of altruism were also incorporated into policy debates. Because sociobiology is supposedly a science devoted to prediction, these frameworks are poorly suited for understanding
conflicting data and extreme variation under circumstances held
27. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMIDOMAIN (1985).
28. Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 MIAMI L. REV. 21, 47 (1986).
29. Richard Epstein, 41 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 586-87 (2003) (reviewing PAUL H.
RUBIN, DARWINIAN POLITICS: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN OF FREEDOM (2002)).
30. See generally SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: MATERNAL INSTINCTS AND
HOW THEY SHAPE THE HUMAN SPECIES (2000) (an excellent self-critique of sociobiology).
NENT
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constant. As a result, in striving to keep the sociobiological faith,
practitioners offer analyses that often lack rigor and consistency.
Beckstrom’s work, cited with approval by Posner, is exemplary of
this. While adopting an overt tone of modest scientific neutrality,
he puts forward unfalsifiable arguments that betray two glaring failures. First, he treats contemporary law in the United States as both
a dependent and an independent variable for something like the
field of sociobiology. Second, he deploys different decision rules
for interpreting the evidence. When U.S. policies violate Beckstrom’s natural selection hypotheses, he suggests that U.S. policies
should change. On the other hand, when U.S. policies are consistent with Beckstrom’s sociobiological models, then this is evidence
that sociobiology is a robust science. Beckstrom’s empirical inferences are internally inconsistent elsewhere as well. Exactly the
same practices may mean one thing in one context and the direct
opposite in another — both of course supporting his overarching
sociobiological project.
“[I]t may seem circular or inconsistent to suggest that a theory,
when substantiated, may be used to add strength and verity to a
structure like the law and then suggest that there is some strength
of verity in the structure that might be used to test the theory,”31
Beckstrom acknowledges. This observation crystallizes the paradox
of the sociobiologist’s mission — to add “strength” to what its own
survival suggests is already powerful, and to add “verity” to what, by
its own self-account, is indisputably true. Although Beckstrom
seems to recognize he is in a bit of a muddle, without this circularity
sociobiology is just another source of testable hypotheses, and not a
privileged site for policy prescriptions.
In addition to the revealing semantics of Beckstrom’s methodological admissions, the goal of using the law as a dependent and
an independent variable substantively requires research outcomes
that are every bit as pre-determined as the human behavior Beckstrom investigates. Real change, creativity, imagination, something
new and interesting is impossible. Laws can only “strengthen” what
is already there, albeit not in effect, which is very dull indeed. If
one is going about advocating a new thing, why not celebrate its
newness rather than treat it as more of the same? In other words,
31.

BECKSTROM, supra note 23, at 114.
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the decision to advocate change is not for fixed moral reasons, but
for fixed natural ones. If one is going to advocate change, then it is
clear something is missing, something will be done differently.
The decision for law to be an instrument of science is not a
moral, but an aesthetic one. The actual result of all this is that even
those experiences that confound sociobiological expectations are
ones Beckstrom points out need to be adjusted so as to
“strengthen” the social organism,32 while those behaviors consistent
with Beckstrom’s sociobiological hypotheses prove their “verity.”33
The defense of this sometimes bidirectional, sometimes inferential
process is the assertion that it is possible to distinguish “aspects of
the law and legal process that might profitably be looked to for testing from those that might be in need of fine tuning.”34 The suggestion that one could just as easily swap causes with effects
inadvertently reveals the laziness of those who inhabit the sociobiological universe.
Exemplary of the empirical sloppiness in Beckstrom’s work is
the epistemic status of lawmakers themselves. His account of his
subjects’ attributes changes depending on the section of the book.
Where Beckstrom wants to convince his readers that legal opinions
confirm sociobiological predictions he says the “three million easily
accessible reports on human transactions written by educated, experienced, and generally articulate members of U.S. society should
be considered the equivalent of the accumulated cultural knowledge of ‘elders,’ in a broad sense of the term [used] by anthropologists.”35 Just as tribal elders supposedly provide a good clue into the
broader norms of the societies they inhabit, when judicial elders
share the “same opinion regarding typical behavior, their consensus lends confidence that it was right,” and hence such opinions
“can assist in testing sociobiological theory.”36 However, when examining these same “elders” elsewhere in the text he wants to use
them to advance a contradictory sociobiological claim, namely that
such lawmakers are not representative, but rather selfish individuals
seeking to advance the interests of their own narrow group.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See
See
Id.
Id.
Id.

id. at 22; BECKSTROM, supra note 22, at 25.
BECKSTROM, supra note 23, at 87.
at 114.
at 97.
at 116.

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR117.txt

2004]

unknown

Seq: 15

8-DEC-04

LEGAL AESTHETICS OF THE FAMILY AND THE NATION

13:52

331

In trying to understand how it is the case that avowedly representative political institutions regularly pass laws that “disproportionately benefits a narrow group that includes the lawmakers,”37
Beckstrom points out that this too confirms sociobiologists’ predictions. Legislation consistently favoring the older, wealthy, white
men “illustrate[s] how one might approach an isolated legal action
from a sociobiological viewpoint in an effort to uncover the selfinterest of the responsible lawmakers.”38 Since the traits of wealth,
age, sex, and race Beckstrom imputes to the majority of legislators
hold for the majority of the judges who write legal opinions, it is
difficult to understand why the views of the legislators should be
held to be partial and the views of the judges to indicate unmediated elder reports on their broader culture. From the outset it
is simply impossible, by Beckstrom’s own account, to assess whether
laws and court opinions reveal something about the motives of the
participants making decisions or those of some median “average”
individual in a particular society.
Another example of this flawed reasoning occurs in Beckstrom’s discussion of custody law. When it suits his argument that
“parental solicitude” is reserved to genetic progeny,39 Beckstrom
says that marriage is not a good proxy for inferring paternity.40
However, in a much earlier section, making a different point on the
subject, he asserts that marriage is a good indicator of paternity.41
“What to make of this kind of stuff?” asks Thomas Grey, after
listing similar inconsistencies in the analysis and evidence that Richard Epstein uses to advance evolutionary frameworks for understanding property law:
In one sense, Takings belongs with the output of the constitutional lunatic fringe, the effusions of gold bugs, tax
protestors, and gun-toting survivalists. It is a sign of the
times that the book is published not under some vanity or
right-wing specialty imprint, but by the Harvard University Press. Richard Epstein himself is no semi-literate
pamphleteer, but the James Parker Hall Professor of Law
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 82.
Id. at 85.
BECKSTROM, supra note 22, at 15; BECKSTROM, supra note 23, at 50.
BECKSTROM, supra note 22, at 90.
Id. at 24.
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at the University of Chicago . . . . In the face of all this it
seems necessary to say that Takings is a travesty of constitutional scholarship.42

Although the scholarship of sociobiologists has been severely criticized over the years, the work still retains the aura of rigor and objectivity or, as Posner puts it, a non-ideological “pragmatism” that
claims to be interested purely in making our society run with the
least friction possible.43
IV.

WHAT WORKS: A NEW PRAGMATISM

One way to think about the dichotomy between those who emphasize the importance of nature and those who emphasize the
role of ideas — including political tracts, art, and scientific articles
— in shaping human behavior and laws is to understand the two
poles as forming a dialectic between what works and our ideas
about what works. In other words, we are used to thinking that
although our ideas of reality may shape behaviors that then affect
reality, there is a very distinct realm of what is real, and ideas about
what is real only affect the former through a mediating agent or
institution. Legal scholars committed to sociobiology want to avoid
mistaken conceptions of reality: only when we are correct are we
the most efficient (“strong”) or the most truthful (sociobiology’s
“verity”).
When we abide by such a dichotomy between nature and ideas
we do not pay attention to the tremendous range in what can work
and hence overlook the large number of possibilities for what will
be the so-called right idea. Many practices may work, and many
potentially right ideas exist, the truth of any one is dependent on
what is being done, and especially on what is being institutionalized
through law at any particular point.44 This differs from a perspectivalist claim that what counts as the truth varies in the eye of the
beholder. Here it is in their uses — various, conflicting, and at
different levels of self-consciousness — that ideas are grasped as
42. Grey, supra note 28, at 24-5.
43. POSNER, supra note 24.
44. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood
ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (1820) (offering the strongest and also the most nuanced
theoretical explication on the subtle ways that law makes truth).
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having different degrees of reality;45 and this differs from claiming
that what seems true changes depending on subjective beliefs of
observers. This challenge to the view of what counts as real depends on a new understanding of physics, not metaphysics. Ideas,
symbols, and beliefs only exist as things, as the ink on the page, the
electronic emissions on the screen, the compression of air when
one speaks and so forth. Noticing this may assist those anxious
about acknowledging power and truth in what cannot be seen and
touched, in realizing that ideas too are real, because they too are
material.
The ostensibly objective views of law put forward by Posner,
Beckstrom, and Epstein are actually visions, guidelines for what will
be created, with imminence conveyed by being grounded in matters of fact. As is the case in all views, they may emerge first in a
subtle material, as talk, or an academic paper circulated on the internet, just as others may be presented in an avant-garde film, a
joke or a prayer perhaps, and then, for some of these ideas, in
forms that seem much more tangible than “mere” ideas, in buildings, in transportation networks, in nations, families, races, sexes,
ethnicities, religions, and then in nature, from the Latin nasci,
meaning birth, that which cannot be changed, questioned, a real
fact. Any indeterminacy of what is real, what is material, does not
depend on what is either a priori practical or material, but rather
what is put into practice. Laws and behaviors are materialized
through the vision and will of political agents implementing their
aesthetics, not our instincts.
Were it the case that laws could claim legitimacy on the
grounds that they were simply reinforcing innate instincts, evolutionary theorists in the United States should be demanding the end
of state sanctioned marriage, since the practice clearly is not one
that people are finding especially adaptive. As to those behaviors
that are truly selected for by nature, governments do not need to
impose rules or provide special incentives, as did President George
W. Bush in his proposal to spend $1.5 billion to bolster the institu-

45. See also Jacqueline Stevens, Symbolic Matter: DNA and Other Linguistic Stuff, 20
SOC. TEXT 105, 105-136 (2002).
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tion of marriage.46 That the legal codification of “heterosexuality”
is not always easy does not, however, mean it is not pragmatic, or
even that it is wrong. The present marriage policy in the United
States is both impractical and practical, depending on what one
wants society to look like. The real problem facing those who want
to use insights about the role of law in society to improve the
human condition is not that we lack empirical information on what
laws do, or even what works best, but the sense that law is reflecting
human nature and not creating it, that our beliefs about human
nature are fixed in certain ways because we are led to believe
human nature itself is a fixed and determinate condition.
The first reason that such a view on the relation between law
and nature needs to be directly addressed is that most of what people believe about our most important practices and identities, from
marriage to nationalism to religious observance, is based on neuroses. Second, and relatedly, if people hold fast to their present beliefs this means death to creativity, openness, and possibility.47
When law’s form is seen as passively reproducing nature’s plan,
then this affects, or better, refracts the content in a particular manner that in turn informs us of law’s shape as well. This is not because of any direct causal activity between form and content, but
rather how the fit between law’s form and content yields a specific
meaning. The effectiveness of this can be seen in its ability to exercise its authority so quietly and imperceptibly.
One can find numerous political and legal theoretical treatises
dedicated to explaining how the authors know that governance
should be based on the assumption that human nature, though
plastic or evil, can be molded or repressed. But very few authors in
the social sciences are associated with a thoroughgoing theoretical
or epistemological defense of sociobiology.48 Instead, one finds so46. See Robert Pear & David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Plans $1.5 Billion Drive for Promotion of Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at A1.
47. This is Nietzsche’s critique of sociobiology’s effect on moral psychology. See
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE (Bernard Williams ed., Josefine Nanckhoff
trans., Cambridge University Press 2001) (1887) [hereinafter THE GAY SCIENCE]; see also
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF Morality (Keith Ansell-Pearson ed., Carol
Diethe trans., Cambridge University Press 1994) (1887) (critiquing and parodying sociobiologist Paul Ree).
48. Cf. EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (1999) (a natural scientist’s theoretical defense of sociobiology).
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cial scientists, especially economists and political scientists, but also
legal theorists, simply referencing social biologists and evolutionary
psychologists as a matter of empirical veracity. Implicit in the absence of a political theoretical defense of sociobiology in the social
sciences is the belief that the objective discussion of observed
human behaviors does not require a justification, that this research
and its policy implications are simply representing reality.
An example of this invocation of scientific authority without
any theoretical inquiry appears in a law journal article explaining
the basis of the U.S. Constitution in proto-evolutionary theory.
John McGinnis writes:
It is only recently that the fruits of this revolution in the
social sciences have become widely available to the public,
partly because many social scientists are hostile to these
ideas for political reasons. In the long run, however, science cannot be suppressed. The ongoing rediscovery of
the constraints of human nature accounts in large measure for the recent skepticism in Washington about collectivist solutions imposed in the past.49

The market-based solutions for awarding the hazards and benefits
of public goods and the absence of national health care are symptoms of Washington’s embrace of evolutionary theory McGinnis endorses. As an implicit corollary, McGinnis must think that the
“rediscovery” of social Darwinism by U.S. policymakers — because
social Darwinism is the right lens for understanding human behavior — makes the United States a better country than those that
have more communitarian and altruistic norms. Rather than take
the United States’s acceptance of evolutionary psychology as endorsement of U.S. policies, the more empirically interested investigation of this sort would have noticed that every other advanced
industrial society in the world today has a much more substantial
investment in public goods and welfare, and might have inquired
into this variation (especially in light of the higher life expectancies
and lower rates of infant mortality in these other countries, that
natural selection especially would seem to favor). By only applying
the natural selection hypothesis to the United States, McGinnis vio49. John O. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 251, 261 (1996).
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lates a basic rule of social science. Selecting his case on the dependent variable (conservative social policies during Reagan’s
presidency), he overlooks the plethora of practices at odds with his
hypothesis. McGinnis never asks why “constraints of human nature” only are recognized by the homo sapiens in 1980s Washington, D.C. and not those in Stockholm. A more honest appraisal of
the social policies among countries would lead to dismissal of the
truisms of evolutionary psychology rather than an elevation of the
stature of U.S. policies for their agreement with McGinnis’s sociobiological premises.
Explicitly committed to an agnostic pragmatism (whatever
leads to survival is practical), sociobiologists are inevitably apologists for a crusading, albeit confused, conglomeration of patriarchalism, individualism, and nationalism (whatever leads to
advancing men’s honor, self-interest, and a nation’s dominance is
good). In her review of Posner’s Sex and Reason, Margaret Chon
nicely states the tension between the commitment to utopianism
and to pragmatism that runs through Posner’s work. On the one
hand, Chon writes, Posner reveals the “modernist desire for objective reason and the utopian possibilities it might release, if we only
could just get it right.”50 On the other hand, she quotes Posner
writing, “The pragmatist’s real interest is not in truth at all but in
belief justified by social need.”51 Summarizing the tension she
writes:
[T]hough he confirms elsewhere that science is a social
activity, he adheres in Sex and Reason to a narrative of science that reinforces the way things are in nature perspective . . . . His selective use of evolutionary theory shows a
compulsive need to authenticate his discipline of economics as this type of science, much like a nervous outsider who name-drops endlessly in an effort to be
accepted at a party.52

To be clear, I am not claiming that the academic terrain of legal
theory in the United States is dominated by evolutionary psycholog50. Margaret Chon, Sex Stories — A Review of Sex and Reason by Richard A. Posner, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 162, 174 (1993) (book review).
51. Id. at 175.
52. Id.
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ical models. The Chicago School’s glorification of markets because
they mimic natural selection or Posner’s use of evolutionary theory
to explain human behavior are just one part of legal theory. In fact,
a cursory review of articles in leading law and law and society journals would suggest that the field of legal theory is equally populated
by social critics with subtle readings of the complexities of power,
violence, and how law presently shapes, or should shape, our legal
relations. Those essays on sex, sexuality, race, ethnicity and justice
that dominate law school syllabi and most of those in the top ranks
of U.S. law faculties today have little interest in sociobiology.
Indeed the disparity between the legal aesthetic sensibilities of
leading law scholars and those setting the social policy agenda for
the U.S. government over the past twenty years is truly stunning.
To take the obvious example of Rawls, criticized in law journals for
his conservatism more than anything else, one would think that
there is an inverse relationship between a theorist’s importance to
other scholars and the extent to which a theorist’s ideas will be debated, much less implemented, at the highest levels of U.S.
government.53
So if people like Posner, Beckstrom, Epstein, and McGinnis are
not gleaning their views from most law review articles, and in fact
are fiercely attacked by their peers, what is the intellectual community authorizing these evolutionary frameworks for law? In order to
understand the basis of the views held not only by many influential
legal theorists, but much of the American public, we need to turn
to experts on whom their approaches rely, writers who are not legal
scholars themselves, but evolutionary biologists and psychologists.

53. Peter Schlag writes:
This pluralization of the study of law entails a proliferation of idioms, methods, and the like. In the classic academic scenario, a ‘new’ form of knowledge is ‘discovered.’ . . .. Conferences are held. Symposia are organized.
And a few years later, no one remembers. All that is left are the rows upon
rows of silent, bound books neatly shelved in the law library. Differentiations are produced. But they lack staying power.
Schlag, supra note 7, at 1101.
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SOCIOBIOLOGISTS BEING CITED BY TODAY’S
LEGAL SCHOLARS?

To be persuaded that legal practices and other human creations should be contemplated without reference to beliefs about
biological constraints, as agoraXchange requires, means showing
that the family in particular, and the nation more generally — institutions providing the bedrock of the human sociobiological paradigm — result from laws, not genes. This entails considering the
authors’ sociobiological legal scholars reference, in particular competing evidence to claims that the family, the nation — indeed any
bonding within so-called primordial groups antagonistic to others
— and all other organisms are partial to their own kind.54 To the
extent that the premises of the writers such as E.O. Wilson, Richard
Dawkins, and Donald Symons are flawed, the analyses drawing on
these works by Posner, Beckstrom, Epstein, and McGinnis to ratify a
passive hierarchical violent world merely are reflecting the fantasies
of these writers. Calling attention to the problems in this work is
important because the proliferation of these sociobiological fantasies is producing an ugly world, and not simply because
bioeconomic legal fictions misapprehend the world.
A. The Human Family Exists Because of Evolution and Natural
Selection
According to the revised 2000 edition of E.O. Wilson’s famous
textbook on sociobiology:
The building block of nearly all human societies is the
nuclear family. The populace of an American industrial
city, no less than a band of hunter-gatherers in the Austra54. For a critique of these sociobiological authors, see generally ANNE FAUSTOSTERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND MEN (2d ed.,
1992) (1985); STEPHEN JAY GOULD, EVER SINCE DARWIN: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY (1977); STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY (2002);
FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY: BOUNDARIES, INTERSECTIONS, AND FRONTIERS (Patricia Adair Gowaty ed., 1993); DONNA HARAWAY, PRIMATE VISIONS: GENDER, RACE, AND
NATURE IN THE WORLD OF MODERN SCIENCE (1989) (primatologists take images of families from human societies and use them to represent other primates); RICHARD LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA (1991) (critique of genetic
determinism); ALAS, POOR DARWIN: ARGUMENTS AGAINST EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
(Hilary Rose & Steven Rose eds., 2002); R.C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES:
BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY AND HUMAN NATURE (1985).
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lian desert, is organized around this unit. In both cases
the family moves between regional communities, maintaining complex ties with primary kin by means of visits
(or telephone calls and letters) and the exchange of gifts.
During the day the women and children remain in the
residential area while the men forage for game or its symbolic equivalent in the form of barter and money. The
males cooperate in bands to hunt or deal with neighboring groups. If not actually blood relations, they tend at
least to act as ‘bands of brothers.’ Sexual bonds are carefully contracted in observance with tribal customs and intended to be permanent. Polygamy, either covert or
explicitly sanctioned by custom, is practiced predominantly by the males.55

This section, coming at the end of a long textbook climbing the
evolutionary tree, implies that the alleged frequency of the “nuclear
family” in other species and in our hunter-gatherer ancestors
proves its necessity for human society. The passage from Wilson
also suggests that the nuclear family is nested in a larger modernday equivalent of a clan, or band of blood brothers who establish
rules regulating sexual access among themselves to ensure stability
for competing against “neighboring groups.” The family is the
most cohesive and foundational unit of any group, sociobiologists
believe, and hence they infer that just as a father will identify first
with his family against others, families will also coalesce and defend
their groups against others as well.
The result of such patterns, according to Wilson, is first tension
with other groups, and later war:
Any group of people that perceives itself as a distinct
group, and which is so perceived by the outside world,
may be called a tribe. The group might be a race, as ordinarily defined, but it need not be; it can just as well be a
religious sect, a political group, or an occupational group.
The essential characteristic of a tribe is that it should fol-

55. EDWARD O. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 553 (2000) (1975)
(citing V. Reynolds, Kinship and the Family in Monkeys, Apes and Man, 3 MAN 209 (1968));
Lila Leibowitz, Founding Families 21 J. OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 153 (1968).
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low a double standard of morality — one kind of behavior
for in-group relations, another for out-group.56

Wilson points to the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic conflict in Ceylon
as exemplary of this dynamic, explaining that when there is awareness of group difference, “Xenophobia becomes a political virtue”
and the result is violence. “History is replete with the escalation of
this process to the point that the society breaks down or goes to
war,” Wilson explains, “No nation has been completely immune.”57
Emphasizing the instinctive character of such fighting, sociobiologist Konrad Lorenz in his book on aggression writes that the
“militant enthusiasm” of group membership is “dangerously akin to
the triumph ceremony of geese and to analogous instinctive behavior patterns of other animals.” He continues:
The social bond embracing a group is closely connected
with aggression directed against outsiders. In human beings, too, the feeling of togetherness which is so essential
to the serving of a common cause is greatly enhanced by
the presence of a definite, threatening enemy whom it is
possible to hate.58

Lorenz proposes that an objective visitor from Mars would “unavoidably draw the conclusion that man’s social organization is very
similar to that of rats, which, like humans, are social and peaceful
beings within their clans, but veritable devils toward fellow-members of their species not belonging to their own community.”59
Even Joshua Goldstein, a social scientist who reviewed twentyone hypotheses for why it is virtually always men who go to war,
thinks that while biology does not explain the ubiquity of male
soldiers, the very fact of war itself has biological roots:
[The] interstate system reproduces at the level of large
groups the biologically based scripts and dynamics found
at the level of small groups. Overall, the international hierarchy resembles a dominance system, fluid international alliances resemble chimpanzee politics, and the tit56. Id. at 565 (citing Garrett Hardin, Population Skeletons in the Environmental Closet,
in 28 BULL. OF THE ATOM. SCI. 37 (1972)).
57. WILSON, supra note 55, at 565.
58. KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 245-46 (Marjorie Latzke trans., 1996).
59. Id. at 205.
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for-tat reciprocity studied by international relations researchers resembles the reciprocal behaviors that enable
cooperation in small groups.60

Although institutions such as the United Nations and multilateral
treaties may ameliorate some harms, the biological roots of group
difference ultimately demand deadly confrontations, meaning “armies that answer to large-group rules — conquest, dehumanization,
and lethal violence.”61
B. Assessing the Evidence on the Evolutionary Basis of the Family
Significantly, Wilson’s fantasies about the so-called average
family in a typical city have no basis in our empirical experiences.
In the United States, about half of those over fifteen years old are
unmarried, and among those married only 21% conform with Wilson’s statement of what is normal, i.e., a household with a sole male
wage-earner.62
Also, Lorenz and other sociobiologists assume domestic harmony. But if Lorenz’s Martian were to touch down on earth this
visitor would observe that about half of all violent deaths worldwide
since 1989 have occurred in war (about 8 million),63 and of the
remaining, the plurality were a result of intimate partner violence,
parental violence, and suicide.64 As alluded to above, Wilson’s
description of the family in an industrial city, supposedly written for
a revised 2000 edition, misrepresents the facts. Almost half the children in the United States will not be raised by two parents who are
genetically related to them,65 a situation sociobiologists predict
would not occur because individuals should have little interest in
devoting their resources to the continuation of someone else’s
genes and genetic fathers should stay with the mothers of their chil60. JOSHUA GOLDSTEIN, GENDER AND WAR 408 (2001).
61. Id. at 409.
62. United States Census Bureau, America’s Families and Living Arrangements, Table
A2 and Table FG2, (June 29, 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/population/
www/socdemo/hh-fam.html.
63. World Health Org. World Report on Violence and Health (Etienne Kurg et al.
eds., World Health Organization 2002).
64. Id.
65. United States Census Bureau, America’s Families and Living Arrangements, Table
A2 and Table FG2 (June 29, 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/population/
www/socdemo/hh-fam.html.
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dren to protect them.66 While one might expect such an empirical
error from a casual social commentator, that it comes from an esteemed natural scientist speaks volumes about the importance of
ideology in this field.
Not only is Wilson’s bread-winner model of the family inaccurate, when such families exist, they tend to be those with the most
violence. A study of ethnographic data from ninety societies concludes that “wife beating occurs more often in societies in which
men have economic and decision-making power in the household
[and] where women do not have easy access to divorce. . .”67 Interestingly, whereas Wilson’s genetic account would predict men
would not harm pregnant wives, as that would endanger their progeny, the data show that intimate partner violence is responsible for
a great deal of maternal mortality: “A recent study among 400 villages and seven hospitals in Pune, India, found that 16% of all
deaths during pregnancy were the result of partner violence. . . Being killed by a partner has also been identified as a important cause
of maternal deaths in Bangladesh and in the United States.”68
And even more damning for Wilson’s claims about genetics
than evidence that marriage contributes to fathers harming the
mothers of their children and indirectly harming their children,
are data showing parents directly injuring and killing their own
children. Compare Wilson’s prototype of happy hunter-gatherer
families with the following:
66. Martin Daly and Margo Wilson claim sociobiological theory accommodates
this behavior because the vast majority of familial violence is men attacking their partners or stepfathers attacking their partners’ children — behaviors they infer do not
jeopardize the progeny of genetic children. Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, The Evolutionary Social Psychology of Family Violence, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY:
IDEAS, ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS (Charles Crawford & Dennis Krebs eds., 1998). But,
partner violence frequently includes attacks on the mothers of their genetic children.
Hence, since Daly and Wilson also believe that being raised by a genetic mother enhances the fitness of one’s progeny, they make an inferential error by not realizing that
killing or impairing the mother of one’s genetic children would indeed adversely impact one’s genes. Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Evolutionary Social Psychology and Family
Homicide, 242 SCI. 519 (1988). See Hans Temrin et al., Step-parents and Infanticide: New
Data Contradict Evolutionary Predictions, 267 PROC. OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y, Series B, 943
(2000) (citing new empirical challenges to their data).
67. World Health Org. World Report on Violence and Health (Etienne Kurg et al.
eds., World Health Organization 2002).
68. Id. at 102 (internal citations omitted).
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• In a cross-sectional survey of children in Egypt, 37% reported being beaten or tied up by their parents and 26% reported physical
injuries such as fractures, loss of consciousness or permanent disability as a result of being beaten or tied up.
• In a recent study in the Republic of Korea, parents were questioned about their behavior towards their children. Two-thirds of
parents reported whipping their children and 45% confirmed
that they had hit, kicked or beaten them.
• A survey of households in Romania found that 4.6% of children
reported suffering severe and frequent physical abuse, including
being hit with an object, being burned or being deprived of food.
Nearly half of Romanian parents admitted to beating their children ‘regularly’ and 16% to beating their children with objects.
• In Ethiopia, 21% of urban schoolchildren and 64% of rural
schoolchildren reported bruises or swellings on their bodies resulting from parental punishment.69
A study in China indicated an annual rate of “severe violence
against children, as reported by parents, of 461 per 1000.”70 In
light of the high proportion of children sustaining injuries from
their parents and even being killed by them, it is easy to see why
Freud would think the many of us who find value in the family,
even when we are not directly participating in violence ourselves,
are not affirming but denying life.
The above statistics about family violence and misery are very
incomplete portraits of family life. We all know that families can
also be sources of tremendous warmth and intimacy. Many parents
provide for their children’s emotional and physical needs in ways
that are entirely admirable. But because the opposite occurs as
well, it seems important that when evaluating the contributions to
human well-being made by the present family structure we take in
what happens there in all of its complexity, which requires abandoning myths enticing us to embrace it wholeheartedly as a site of
safety and unambivalent love. Looking objectively at the history of
the family, it is impossible to see how anyone could meet the burden of proving the extravagant claims offered on behalf of its contributions to the happiness and well-being of its members.
69.
70.

Id. at 62 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 63 (internal citations omitted).
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Just as family violence is not primarily a consequence of families fighting against each other but a site of internal conflict, the
nation and war are not necessary expressions of innate aggression,
either, both having been challenged frequently and intensely by
those with empathic and cosmopolitan commitments.71 Eloquently
summarizing the impulse informing the acts of courage by those
opposing violence in their name, Dunja Blazevic, Director of the
Soros Center for Contemporary Arts, Sarajevo told me, “The first
responsibility everyone has is to resist the nationalism of their own
country.” By showing the centrality of legal changes to the variation
in our past and present affinities, it is possible for legal theorists to
demonstrate the plausibility of new images of governance, such as
those agoraXchange promotes, and relatedly, to counter the conservative pseudo-empiricism, in other words, the wishful thinking of
conservative ideologues.
C. Sociobiologists as Utopians
The conventional wisdom these days pits sociobiological “realists” against social constructivist “idealists,” with the former telling
the latter that their visions of change are idle fantasies. But as we
see in the evidence above, insofar as sociobiological preferences for
the nuclear family with a male head of household is neither adaptive nor prevalent, the norms that follow from their theories are as
utopian as the cosmopolitan, egalitarian ones they dismiss.
It is telling that the sociobiologist who authored the “selfish
gene” theory Posner celebrates, Richard Dawkins, actually rejects
inferences from genes to decisions about war and peace. At the
end of a book urging that natural selection occurs at the level of
individual genes and not species, Dawkins says that the basis on
which individual humans decide whether and how to join and perpetuate groups is not determined by genetic natural selection:
As an enthusiastic Darwinian, I have been dissatisfied with
explanations that my fellow-enthusiasts have offered for
human behavior. They have tried to look for ‘biological
advantages’ in various attributes of human civilization.
For instance, tribal religion has been seen as a mechanism for solidifying group identity . . . The argument I
71.

See STEVENS, supra note 2.
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shall advance, surprising as it may seem coming from the
author of earlier chapters, is that, for an understanding of
the evolution of modern man, we must begin by throwing
out the gene as the sole basis of our ideas of evolution.72

Instead of biological fitness selecting for genes as the motor of
human civilization, Dawkins argues that it is new ideas that may be
selected for — what he calls “memes” — and that these convey discrete beliefs. The ones people like — evaluated on many grounds
and not just whether they are conducive to biological fitness — are
the ones that survive and that influence human behavior independent of genetic pressures.73
Although he does not acknowledge it, Dawkins must have
known he was echoing a point that had been made by philosophers
and social critics since Plato, that as our biology shapes the ideas
that may be selected for — certain beliefs are simply unimaginable
because of our biology and environment — our ideas shape our
biology. In the case of Plato’s Republic it was assumed that if a “noble lie” were told indicating people were born of the earth with
gold, silver, or copper, then people would behave in a manner conducive to a strong, well-ordered society, not because such a distinction of metals existed but because those believing this to be the case
would act accordingly. In the case of Plato’s society or any other
going to war, the most crucial biological fact of life or death is not
determined by genes but by hegemonic ideas, especially those expressed in laws.74
Advocating a very active view of the role humans consciously
play in shaping their destinies, Dawkins writes:
[E]ven if we look on the dark side and assume that man is
fundamentally selfish, our conscious foresight — our capacity to simulate the future in imagination — could save
us from the worst selfish excesses . . . . We can see the
long-term benefits of participating in a ‘conspiracy of
doves’, and we can sit down together to discuss ways of
making the conspiracy work. We have the power to defy
the selfish genes of our birth and, if necessary, the selfish
72.
73.
74.

RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 191 (2d ed. 1990).
Id. at 192.
See PLATO, supra note 15.
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memes of our indoctrination. We can even discuss ways
of deliberately cultivating and nurturing pure, disinterested altruism — something that has no place in nature,
something that has never existed before in the whole history of the world.75

According to Dawkins, it is memes or ideologies prescribing selfish
behaviors, not genes. When it comes to human possibilities of
peace and altruism, even if a selfish gene exists, it has indeterminate consequences for what we decide to do. If the internal contradictions in sociobiological thought and its failure to predict obvious
patterns of human behavior are not reason enough to pull away
from the sway of seeing our institutions and behaviors as rooted in
nature, perhaps authorization from someone viewed as an eminent
authority on natural selection may urge us forward in a project
demonstrating the contingencies of the past and future.
From just this brief sketch of change and debates about foundational practices and institutions we see the ebb and flow of history and the flux at any single moment dissipating any conceivable
image of a single, timeless human nature shaping social events. For
any issue on which observations about instincts are brought to bear
there has been substantial disagreement in ideas and practices: slavery, despotism, hereditary kingdoms, the oppression of women, racial inequality, and the alleviation of colonialism, including in the
British colonies of the Americas, were all at some point defended as
expressions of a natural order whose violation would bring ruin and
even damnation.
VI. THE LEGAL AESTHETICS

OF

FAMILY

AND

NATION

Hegel noted in his Philosophy of Right that while ideas may survive in several cultural media, the most effective method for materializing and extending the life of an idea is through law. In fact, if
an ethical or moral belief is not a law, it quickly becomes just another passing fancy. Slavery is an excellent example of this. It is
truly stunning to compare the ubiquity of slavery over the last several millennia, when it was rarely even questioned, with the virtually
universal condemnation of this institution today. This radical shift
75.

Id. at 200-01.
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is not a result of aggregated individual opinions coincidentally
changing at the same time, much less fast-paced changes in the
means of production, as Marx and some historians of the Americas
allege, but occurred soon after European states accepted the edict
of the Catholic Church prohibiting the enslavement of people captured in just wars, an empty Papal proclamation until European
kings acceded.
The slave trade to the Americas, while protected by law for between two and three centuries after being banned within Europe
beginning in the mid-fifteenth century (depending on the country), was not integrated into the fabric of the state’s existence in the
same way as the earlier enslavement of prisoners of wars and captive
populations. Though this is a topic deserving of far more extensive
discussion, the bottom line is that once untethered from the logic
of war and state survival, slavery came to a relatively quick legal,
behavioral, and then ideological demise. While of course many media beyond our genes influence the shape of the human body and
its possibilities, perhaps the most important is the law.
A. Etymology of Law
That even scientists choose to express their axiomatic observations as “laws of nature” suggests the primal force evoked by the
concept of a law. It is rather interesting that the ultimate expression of certainty regarding a physical event is expressed in a vocabulary directly lifted from the language of specifically human affairs,
not physical ones. Isaac Newton could have characterized gravity in
many ways; there is nothing about consistent behavior which requires this be called a “law” and not something else such as a principle, axiom, or system. This legal nomenclature is not a casual
decision but is one among several places where Newton’s Principia
draws heavily on political images of authority.
Not only does Newton call his statements about physical regularities “leges” (laws) but his concluding chapter, as well as Edmund
Halley’s dedicatory poem, repeatedly invoke images of the political
order to establish and explain the authority of the natural order.
“Behold Jove’s calculation and the laws,” writes Halley, “That the
creator of all things, while he was setting the beginnings of the
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world would not violate,”76 and in a section titled Mundi Systemati
Newton pursues a lengthy, arcane etymological discussion of the
meaning of deus as opposed to dominus deus (“lordship God” is how
Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman translate this).77 Newton elaborates on the implicit sense of political authority ‘deus’ contains:
“Our fellow countryman Pocock derives the word ‘deus’ from the
Arabic word ‘du’ (and in the oblique case ‘di’), which means lord.
And in this sense princes are called gods, Psalms 82 and John 10:35.
And Moses is called a god of his brother Aaron and a god of king
Pharaoh (Exod. 4:16 and 7:1). And in the same sense the souls of
dead princes were formerly called gods by the heathen, but wrongly because of
their lack of dominium.”78 The point of Newton’s etymological exegesis is to assert that the world’s order is not one of simple evident
facts, but carries the same imperatives as a political order on which
even God must depend to make his presence of significance.
Though the text of the Principia appears to advance overt ideas of a
world order that has its own logic that can be deduced but not affected by mortals such as Newton, the framing texts suggest something quite different — that the ultimate original template of
knowledge is that power located in specifically human political affairs. The rule of kings is not like that of the physical imperatives
willed by God, but God is only truly God when ruling like a king,
like one with the supplemental dominus not contained in deus
alone, or at least not in an idiomatic use that does not require
Newton’s etymology.
By bringing this world kingdom to bear on interpreting the
meaning of the cosmos, Newton suggests that it is willful power, not
arbitrary events, that best characterize what makes the universe
work and that if we want to understand how God does all this then
there is no neutral religious vocabulary of God that evokes the right
metaphor. Rather, Newton needs to resort to the political vocabulary of kings in order to make clear exactly who his god, the god of
natural laws, really is.
76. Edmund Halley, Ode on This Splendid Ornament of Our Time and Our Nation, the
Mathematica-Physical Treatise by the Eminent Isaac Newton, in ISAAC NEWTON, THE PRINCIPIA.
MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 12 (Bernard Cohen & Anne Whitman eds., 1999) (1867).
77. Id. at 140.
78. Id. at 941.
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By referring to his generalizations about motion as “Axiomata,
sive Leges Motus” and titling each of them “Lex” I-III, Newton selfconsciously evokes the law of Moses, as Halley also infers in his
poem comparing Newton’s laws to the work of “He who commanded us by written tablets to abstain from murder, Thefts, adultery, and the crime of bearing false witness,” and finds Moses “did
less than our author for the condition of mankind.”79 Even more
than Moses’ laws, Newton’s have rendered unto humanity the outlines of God’s fierce power: “Nec fas eft proprius mortal: attingere
divos.”80 Further suggesting the basic metonymic association of law
and politics are carrying along the meanings of God and science is
the fact that the Latin lex and its plural leges that Newton uses were
especially prominent in Ecclesiastical Latin. Both Halley and
Newton would have been very familiar with how lex “especially” referred to the “law of Moses.”81 When Newton announced the laws
of motion he was placing himself in the footsteps of Moses, who
also was informing people, on the highest authority in the universe,
that certain laws existed.
That one could, even after the Ten Commandments, curse
one’s parents did not detract one bit from the certainty and especially the authority which Newton sought for his laws by invoking
those of Moses. While theorists emphasize the difference between
natural law and positive law as the difference between what is inevitable and what is contingent, the very deliberate evocation of law
and its overtly political context of dominion and conquest (what if
the other side had prevailed?) suggests that the firmest foundation
for regularities of existence is not a rock but the human artifice.82
Either written or passed on through tradition and oral history,
those ideas that have the formal imprimatur of political institutions
exert an especially strong influence on our individual and collective
actions, and can be described as having aesthetic as well as prag79. Halley, supra note 76, at 12.
80. Isaac Newton, In Viri Praestantissimi Isaaci Newtoni Opus Hocce MathematicoPhysicum Feculi Gentifque Decus Egregium, in PHILOSOPHIAE NATURALIS PRINCIPIA
MATHEMATICA 14 (3d ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1972) (1720).
81. A Latin Dictionary (Charlton T. Lewis & Charles Short eds., Clarendon Press
1879), available at Perseus Project, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/enggreek?
lang=LA (last modified 2001).
82. John Seery, Castles in the Air: An Essay on Political Foundations, 27 POL. THEORY
460 (1999) (critiquing how post-foundationalists overlook the artifice of foundations).
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matic causes and effects. One way to think about Newton’s use of
“lex” as the image for the regularities he had in mind is to contemplate its aesthetics for our period as well. Instead of the sociobiological instinct — to use nature as providing evidence for the form
of law — Newton authorizes us to consult the form of law for understanding the (phenomenological) evidence of nature. What we
think is nature is not only made by law, but has its very idea of
inevitable patterns exemplified through law. To understand what
this sort of law looks like requires understanding the aesthetics of
this word-image.
B. AgoraXchange
To the realists — You sober people who feel well armed against passion and fantasies and would like to turn your emptiness into a matter of pride and ornament: You call yourselves realists and hint that
the world really is the way it appears to you.
Only as creators! — This has given me greatest trouble and still does:
to realize what things are called is incomparably more important
than what they are. The reputation, money, and appearance, the
usual measure and weight of a thing, what it counts for . . . all this
grows from generation unto generation, merely because people believe in it, until it gradually grows to be part of the thing and turns
into its very body.
What at first was appearance becomes in the end, almost invariably,
the essence and is effective as such. How foolish it would be to
suppose that one only needs to point out this origin and this misty
shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts for real,
so-called ‘reality.’ We can destroy only as creators. But let us not
forget this either: it is enough to create new names and estimations
and probabilities in order to create in the long run new ‘things’.83
In these passages Nietzsche is confronting social Darwinians, whom
he saw as creating and not describing an especially debased sort of
human being. Rather than accept the conventional division between scientists and artists, Nietzsche thought that all representations, including those of the moral psychologists whom he
confronted, were a form of artistry. Insofar as the words and
images being used were making us bad people — the passive, dull,
83.

THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 47, §58.
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inert matter of natural selection — the problem with scientists was
not that they were unobjective, but that they were bad artists. The
words of these scientists were creating an undesirable kind of
human and to the extent that such figures were accepted, these
scientists would be right about us. To be clear, they would be right
not because they had objectively observed us as we truly are, but
because their words would materialize us to embody their images.
To challenge these scientists it was not enough to simply critique
their ideas, but rather, Nietzsche thought, writers needed to proliferate new images of humans in order to create new human beings.
The purpose of agoraXchange is to concretize Nietzschean insights about legal institutions in two ways: first by showing how current political institutions embody a dialectic of law’s form and
substance. While in form and content today’s laws effect i.e., as in
make efficacious, an organism restricted by hereditable laws of nature, the site proposes that this is not because of any deep truth
about our nature, but due to the institutionalization of a very specific legal aesthetic. Second, the website’s form and content provide a way of presenting an alternative legal aesthetic for decisions
that are neither inevitable nor immutable. Gearey writes: “The aesthetic provocation to legal theory is thus to continue a will to
power, to will a different way of thinking and feeling the law.”84 By
providing a forum where people may participate in re-imagining
our institutions toward the end of playing new games, those not
based on the present materialism and nativism cultivated by the
current political order’s insistence of distinctions of birth, images of
a new world come into being. This is not a naı̈ve statement abut
the viability of a website to instantly make a new world, but an acknowledgement of the materiality and reality of this space in itself,
where people not only work on designing a game, but also post and
moderate forums on related projects, share information about political issues, and organize informally and more formally to work
beyond the site as well. The site is to be hosted in art and media
centers as well as universities globally — including India, China,
Mexico, Turkey, and Japan — agoraXchange will have mirror sites
in languages other than English.85
84.
85.

GEAREY, supra note 11, at 76.
http://www.agoraxchange.net (last modified July 22, 2004).
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Integrating with practices of collaborative communities online,
on the streets, in the workplace, the arts, universities, and in formal
and informal conversations, meetings, and conferences that cut
across these lines, agoraXchange does not point toward new models
of politics, but itself performs this alternative community, one
where people participate because of a desire to create, not destroy,
and where individuals are recognized for what they do and not who
they are. The game that will draw on these ideas will then be an
experiment showing the kinds of conflicts and resolutions that will
emerge in a world without incentives of kinship and nationality.

